



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

be brought about by setting in motion administrative mechanism of the kind advocated by Mr. Salter.

It is curious to observe in this narrative how effective co-operation developed through personal contacts and how national representatives came to realise the needs of countries other than their own. It is alarming, however, to realise—and this fact should not be underestimated—how often, when a solution depended on good will and not on insight, the Allies were forced into it by a common sense of danger greater than their individual selfishnesses,—usually described as “interests.” Yet here again administrative machinery provided the occasion, if not the motive for compromising the issues. Mr. Salter’s theme is that there is less danger of wars, when administrative machinery is so devised that international questions are treated in all but the final stages continuously and by experts, instead of being concentrated in the hands of bargaining Foreign Offices. The field of contact is thus circumscribed by the limits of personal competence and tends to become a field of enquiry; understanding is more likely; national *amour-propre* becomes less insistent.

Indeed we believe that here he goes to the root of the matter and that the future lies rather with free interchange of opinions between all kinds of public representatives than with the specialised diplomatic intrigues of those who in their hearts still believe in the old pernicious theory of the balance of power while public opinion forces them to do lip-service to another ideal.

ELLIOTT FELKEN.

PARIS.

---

MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Guido de Ruggiero. Translated by A. Howard Hannay and R. G. Collingwood. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 402.

This “comprehensive treatment of the whole development of philosophy in the last half century” is another volume in the “Library of Philosophy Series” edited by J. H. Muirhead. Equal portions are devoted to German, French, Anglo-American and Italian Philosophy, respectively. Obviously the author assumes that philosophies are nationalistic in character.

It is interesting to discover the author’s position through his criticisms of both of the important French schools of to-day: he charges Durkheim with determinism, Bergson with unreflective-

ness. The author has imbibed his Hegelianism through Spaventa and Croce, and cannot therefore treat of pluralism sympathetically; the contradictions and paradoxes are to be criticised not only because they are not coherent, but especially because they do not admit of those categorical values implicit in the developing concepts of science.

We are of course interested to learn what this man thinks of us. There is an emphasis on the work of Royce, whose great merit consists in seeing that knowledge explains possible experience through concentrating the whole of reality into actuality, definiteness and determinateness being achieved through the concrete universal. Ruggiero very much fears, however, that this will finally lead to the elimination of all abstract universality. As for the empirical phase, Pragmatism is summarily dealt with, its rise being viewed as "the most disquieting symptom of the present state of philosophical thought. . . . It is a turbid stream of rubbish, . . . bordering on comedy, if not charlatanism. . . . William James is a curious patchwork of good and evil, of seriousness and extravagance, and of decadence." Dewey and Schiller are dismissed with a word.

Because "no country can complain with greater justice than Italy of the way in which her intellectual life has been overlooked" especially by her own countrymen, the author feels justified in tracing the history of Italian Philosophy further back than any of the others. His first chapter deals with the period "from Machiavelli to Gioberti." The latter and Rosmini were of that school of individualism whose value is just coming to be known; so also, Spaventa shows in 1861, should many other Italians be regarded as precursors of the best of philosophical thought. Croce's great value as a philosophical interpreter of Hegel lies in the fact that he was introduced to this philosophy only after he had become mature through two other disciplines, Vico's historical and æsthetic speculations, and DeSanctis' views of literary criticism.

In his treatment of Logistic, Ruggiero falls under his own criticism: not only is his discussion woefully inadequate—he does not even mention the Neo-Realists—but he fails even to mention the more important contributions of the Italian School, particularly that of Peano. Undoubtedly this difficulty is due to the bias of the author. A more accurate treatment would have shown that although there are no sharp breaks in the continuity

of certain schools, the relations among various schools may be difficult to trace. Any such deviation from the monistic point of view, however, would probably be regarded by the author as a case of "philosophical decadence."

C. F. TAEUSCH.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

### SHORTER NOTICES.

**THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD PEACE:** Essays arranged and edited by F. S. Marvin. London: H. Milford, Oxford: the University Press, 1921. Pp. 191. Price, 9s. 6d. net.

This series of essays and lectures delivered at the Unity Schools in 1920 was arranged in conjunction with the League of Nations Union and introduces the League by stressing certain great and relevant periods of history, the Pax Romana, the Papacy of Innocent III, The French Revolution as a world force and the congress of Vienna, explaining each section out across the strand of history in relation to the ideal of peace which was common to all. They are as good as can be expected within the compass of a score of pages, and especially Sir Paul Vinogradoff on the work of Rome, Mr. G. W. Clark on Grotius, Mr. H. W. C. Davis on the Papacy of Innocent III. The main thesis is the unification of mankind, and the implications of the fact that all the world has come into touch, and that co-operation is a growing quality. But what can be said of the contribution of Mr. H. G. Wells, added, perhaps, as a popular feature to the course? It is not long since he was turning in the *Salvaging of Civilisation* from the League and calling on men to turn their eyes from all such makeshifts and to concentrate on the more arduous ideal of human unity. Of the League of Nations he wrote then:

"The phrase has a thin and litigious flavour. What loyalty and what devotion can we expect this multiple association to command? It has no unity—no personality. It is like asking a man to love the average member of a woman's club instead of loving his wife.

"For the idea of man, for human unity, for one common blood, for the one order of the world, I can imagine men living and dying, but not for a miscellaneous assembly that will not mix—even in its name. It has no central idea, no heart to it, this League of Nations formula."

Though his aversion from the League of Nations is less trenchantly expressed in the present essay (it is merely termed "quite insufficient for the present necessity of Europe"), his ideal is clearly, a widely divergent one, that of the world state.

**THE ORIGIN OF SEXUAL MODESTY.** By Edward Westermarck. London: The Athenæum Press, 1921. (The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology.) Pp. 20. Price, 1s.

Professor Westermarck, who is treating the subject of this paper more fully in the forthcoming edition of his well-known *History of Human Marriage*, was, as he tells us, interested at an early date in the problem why the sexual functions should be wrapped up in a veil of secrecy, with the awful feeling of shame as penalty for improper exposure. His interest led to the writing of his book on the history of marriage, in which, however, the problem of sexual shame is dealt with in a few lines only.